

# Determinants of Peaceful State Secession

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# Violent and Peaceful State Secession

- State secession is normally associated with violence, but sometimes it happens peacefully
- Why do some states fall apart peacefully and others do so through violence?
- E.g., why did Prague and Moscow allow their regions go peacefully in 1991 and 1992, while Belgrade responded to secessionist demands of the Yugoslav republics with force in 1991?

# Evolution and Powerful States

- Violence as the selection mechanism of new states (Gilpin 1983, Spruyt 1994)
- Survival of the fittest, but whose “fitness” is most important? Survival of the host state or of the secessionist region?
- The power of the strong states and their impact on other states in the international system (Berger et al. 2013, Coggins 2011)
- Powerful states are best positioned to exploit the international system of states, but secessionist regions’ qualities matter

# States in International System

- High level of centralization allows states to survive (Gerring et al. 2011)
- Competition by neighboring states puts pressure on the state (Skocpol 1979)
- External territorial threat allows the government to mobilize resources (Gibler and Miller 2014)
- Ethnicity is not conflictual, but it may provide a platform for political mobilization (Hale 2008)

# Some Hypotheses

- $H_1$ : Political centralization and low economic value of region will have synergetic effect on state's decision to allow peaceful secession of region
- $H_2$ : State with high economic power relative to its neighbor states is most likely to allow region to secede without violence

# Data for Statistical Analysis

- Coggins (2011), Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011), contiguity data (COW), historical GDP data (Maddison project and Penn World Table)
- Time frame 1931-2000 (truncated to 1946-2000)
- Contains 256 secessionist movements (truncated to 242 dyads)

## Ordinal Dependent Variable: State Secession and Violence

Order	Combination	Number of Cases	Percent
1	No Violence and No Secession	70	29%
2	Violence and No Secession	74	31%
3	Violence and Secession	19	8%
4	No Violence and Secession	79	32%

# Independent Variables

Name	Description
Autonomy	Political autonomy or Colony
Region's Poverty	Comparison of GDPpc of Region to GDPpc of State
Country's Wealth	Comparison of GDPpc of State to average GDPpc of neighboring states
Distinction	Ethnic and Religious Differentiation of Region from State




# Violence & Secession

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Autonomy	2.10*** (0.28)				1.42*** (0.33)	1.07*** (0.36)
Region's Poverty		1.27*** (0.30)			0.52* (0.29)	-0.97 (0.84)
Autonomy x Region's Poverty						1.83** (0.92)
Country's Wealth			0.30*** (0.10)		0.31** (0.12)	0.30*** (0.11)
Distinction				0.41*** (0.15)	0.02 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.18)
N	242	210	242	242	210	210

Significance codes: 0.001 '\*\*\*', 0.01 '\*\*', 0.05 '\*'

## Interaction of Autonomy and Region's Poverty



# Conclusions


- States are better equipped to exploit international system to their advantage than secessionist regions
- Violence and secession are correlated with the institutions of secessionist regions
- States let go economically weak regions more easily
- High economic power relative to the neighboring states is correlated with the propensity of the state to allow region go peacefully

# UN Membership

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Violence x 10	-0.10*** (0.03)					-0.07** (0.03)
Autonomy		3.49*** (0.52)				2.73*** (0.56)
Region's Poverty			1.31*** (0.31)			0.23 (0.32)
Country's Wealth				0.45*** (0.11)		0.32** (0.13)
Distinction					0.52*** (0.17)	0.14 (0.22)
N	242	242	210	242	242	210

Significance codes: 0.001 '\*\*\*', 0.01 '\*\*', 0.05 '\*'

## Effect of Country's Wealth



Effect of Violence on UN Membership

